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The Impossible Vanishing Point
Societal Differentiation in Imperial Germany
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Benjamin Ziemann
In the third volume of his History of German Society, Hans-Ulrich Wehler painted 
a broad and powerful picture of the political reform blockages in Germany from 
1870–1914 and of the authoritarian remodeling of the political system of Imperial 
Germany. The military’s special constitutional position, the absence of a genuine 
parliamentarization although parliament increasingly had more duties, the 
formally non-political, in fact however conservative-authoritative “government 
through the civil service,” and the “radicalization” of a new “Reich nationalism”—
these are just a few examples of Germany’s negative record in regard to political 
reform from 1870–1914.1 It is possible to criticize Wehler’s insistence on the 
thesis of a German Sonderweg on grounds of formal logic, because National 
Socialism can be considered only partially a Sonderweg if one accepts, following a 
point convincingly argued by key experts, that fascism was a generic, European 
phenomenon in the interwar period.2 But even then, the importance of his 
argument on the political reform blockade cannot be denied. In spite of the many 
revisions historians have made in the last two decades to the older views of the 
socio-historical causes for the Sonderweg, the power of the enemies of reform 
remains a central aspect of the political history of Imperial Germany.3
It is questionable, however, if this blockade in the political system can be taken 
as the yardstick for an overall assessment of the history of German society during 
these years. Wehler assigns politics a central role in German society. According to 
his interpretation, politics, together with the classes which supported this politics, 
was ‘largely responsible’ for the Sonderweg, for the inability of German society to 
deal successfully with the social crisis produced by modernization. One cannot 
find a more explicit way of formulating Wehler’s advocated primacy of politics in 
society than this.4 One can, however, point out, arguing against this verdict, that 
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the history of society since 1800, and especially in the late nineteenth century, 
won considerable stimulus from the progress of social differentiation.
The key message of this chapter is that the accelerating process of social 
differentiation during the final decades of the nineteenth century makes it 
impossible to see society in Imperial Germany as a compact, container-like entity. 
Thus, the deformation of one part of society cannot fairly be attributed to society 
as a whole and cannot determine the historical judgement on an entire era. 
Functional differentiation itself, that is, the development of fields or sub-systems 
of society which are independent against each other, is an important criterion for 
the process of modernization. It encapsulates modernity because it unleashes 
functionally specialized social practices and fields and leads thus to an increase in 
the amount of complexity society can allow for. If functional differentiation 
advances to a topic that contemporaries reflect upon, and through this is itself 
labeled and described as an important signature of a society’s modernity, then 
differentiation is simultaneously a marker of modernity. Or, in other words: 
functional differentiation is both a structural “reality” of modern society and a 
form to describe these realities within society, a self-description of society.5
In a conventional sense, functional differentiation can be understood as the 
dissolution of the old, polyfunctional social configurations which defined the 
social history of the early modern period. The early modern church with its 
special privileges within society and for the aristocracy, the nobility which was 
understood and which saw itself as the ruling estate (Herrschaftsstand), the guilds 
of the artisans and merchants—all these configurations which merged political, 
economic and cultural functions made way for an institutional arrangement in 
which these functions were differentiated into different institutions. This 
development can be described as an empowerment of the state, which 
monopolized both political power and the enforcement of law through the police. 
At the same time, however, the state lost power because it gave up some of the 
economic and cultural competences it had maintained throughout the early 
modern period.6 Such an understanding of functional differentiation, in which 
complex wholes break down into different parts, is called “decomposition” in the 
tradition of sociological theory, employing the biological analogy of cell division.7 
As an alternative to this approach, we can employ an understanding of functional 
differentiation that sociologists tend to call the “emergence” of differentiation. 
Why emergence? Because according to this theory, differentiation is a process 
where new forms of accessing and looking at the social world emerged and 
differentiated themselves. Incidentally, they developed their own structures inside 
society. Or, in other words: functional sub-systems of society are not the result of 
a division of larger entities, but develop when a specific code of communication 
does emerge and can be stabilized. This emergence of functions followed as “world 
views were cultivated, turned into partial entities and finally rendered in terms of 
absolutes,” producing self-referential social forms in the process.8 Hence, this 
form of differentiation also implies an “interruption of interdependence,” because 
developments in one field or sub-system of society no longer automatically or 
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completely affect other fields.9 In modern society, for example, religious 
developments do not necessarily affect science or the arts, whereas science and art 
without religious underpinnings were largely inconceivable during the medieval 
and early modern period.
Based on these reflections on different sociological theories of functional 
differentiation, I will now try to highlight the fact that various processes of 
emergent differentiation occurred in Imperial Germany. One example is the vast 
increase in the number of daily newspapers, moving Germany literally to the “age 
of the mass press.” This development can best be described by examining the 
rapid, quantitative increase in circulation, and through the inner diversification of 
this market; there were no less than 4,200 daily papers in 1914. Concerning the 
political tendencies, it is noticeable that in their public significance and in their 
reception the liberal press from the houses Ullstein and Mosse pushed the 
conservative daily papers to the “second rank.” In the political pecking order, 
however, according to Wehler, the liberal newspapers stayed in a position of 
“political powerlessness.”10 It is questionable whether such a verdict, focusing on 
the political impact of the liberal press, adequately and sufficiently apprehends 
the genuine socio-historical relevance of the daily press, especially if we look at 
this development from the viewpoint of a theory of social differentiation and see 
the emergence of new codes of communication as one key criteria for 
modernization.
From this perspective, it can be seen that the mass media emerged as a 
differentiated sub-system of society in Wilhelmine Germany. To be sure, the press 
as an institutional complex which compiles, selects, and spreads the news in its 
printed form has a history that goes back to the early modern era. In Germany it 
was, however, only in the last decades of the nineteenth century that the press 
developed its specific mode of selecting and circulating information which turned 
the daily press as a mass medium into a coherent self-referential social system. 
Only now did the daily press, like every other differentiated sub-system of society, 
become a duplicate of the social world while it elaborated upon it, but from a 
certain perspective. In this case the perspective was that of information—the 
distinction or code that informs the workings of the mass media is that the 
information in the news was already basically old, non-news at its very moment 
of distribution, having to make space for new news.11 The specific temporality 
and sociability of a world that was constituted through mass media was not 
unique to, but definitely most clearly tangible in, the urban world of the big city 
metropolis, which the daily press both reflected and simultaneously reconstructed 
in its own context.
Berlin, the city that at the end of Imperial Germany had the largest concentration 
of daily newspapers in Europe, can be understood as a metonymy for information 
in printed form, for the “word city” that developed and decayed once again every 
day. This “word city” not only complemented the “real” city that was made of 
bricks and mortar; it also superimposed itself increasingly over the latter and 
represented it. The fleeting nature and urgency of the visual staging of metropolitan 
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life pulsated in its own differentiated temporal structure. This was the rhythm of 
the “extra” issues, which were printed and circulated several times a day—at 
midday, in the evening, and again at night. A crucial example of this trend was the 
BZ am Mittag that Ullstein published from 1904 on. This newspaper relied solely 
on telephone reports. These newspapers with their “extra” editions, in their search 
for the latest news and sensations, did not allow for a single, “authoritative” 
reading and reception of the news; and precisely this openness to a multiplicity of 
readings constituted the social modernity of the mass media as an emergent 
reality. The “word city” in the Berlin daily press thus developed a life of its own, 
so that that the press advanced to an important reference point for the experiences 
and descriptions of modernity in the eyes of the contemporary observer.12 In the 
plenitude of its reports and other textual genres, the Berlin daily press confirmed 
one thing—the big city, in which multiple social processes occur simultaneously, 
is itself an important example and site of functional differentiation.
The emergent differentiation of a functional sub-system of society and its 
specific perspective on the social “world” is not only reflected, it is simultaneously 
advanced by its internal differentiation.13 The duplication or in fact multiplication 
of perspectives and observer positions in modern society implies that every 
perspective will develop zones of contact with other perspectives. This becomes 
especially clear in the modern daily press of the Wilhelmine Empire, in which, 
among other things, the internal differentiation of the papers into sections and 
departments increased. It was the culture section, the pages devoted to the 
economy, local news and articles about sports that gained in available space and 
importance, not politics.14 This new, spectacle-driven style of reporting in the 
Berlin newspapers focused on theatrical effects and episodes. It thus also indicated 
a disruption in interdependence with other sub-systems as the news coverage 
increasingly made it difficult to attribute newsworthy events to a clear-cut political 
interpretation. A good example for this trend is the famous “episode in Köpenick” 
(Köpenickiade) of the cobbler Wilhelm Voigt. In October 1906, Voigt took 
command of a platoon of soldiers wearing a captain’s uniform he had assembled 
from various secondhand shops. With the help of “his” troops, he was able to seize 
control of the town hall in Köpenick, a suburb of Berlin, to detain the mayor and 
get access to four thousand marks from the public purse. In the critical 
historiography on Imperial Germany, this episode has been interpreted as evidence 
of a widespread social militarism and its authoritarian values. From the perspective 
of the contemporary metropolitan press, however, it was first and foremost one 
theatrical buffoonery among many others, one that provided a welcome occasion 
for laughter and ridicule. Only for this reason could the Köpenickiade even hope 
to receive some attention from the metropolitan public, whose attention span was 
limited.15
The development of a social field that was based on the circulation of the most 
“recent” information—as in the urban mass media—was only one example of the 
emergent functional differentiation in Imperial Germany. Another prominent 
example was sports. The gradual extension of leisure time made possible the 
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emergence of a life beyond the world of work. This allowed in particular the new 
bourgeois middle class of salaried employees to exert themselves, searching for 
ways to systematically fill the new budget of free time. To be sure, as with the mass 
media, emergent differentiation was preceded by and could partly built on older 
traditions, in this case those of “gymnastic exercises” (Leibesübungen). These had 
been practiced, for example, in the gymnastics clubs of the German Gymnastics 
Association (Deutsche Turnerschaft), which had been an important part of the 
nationalist movement since the early nineteenth century. Against this backdrop, 
however, modern sport brought a defining new element. Modern sport was 
focused completely on “performance and competition” and this vastly accentuated 
the “measurement of performance and time” as the central perspective of organized 
sports.16 Winning or losing, based on performance, is the code of sports as a self-
referential sub-system of modern society. The members of the German Gymnastic 
Association could at first not find much value in this code of winning and losing. 
The gymnasts were still primarily interested in the disciplining of their bodies for 
the larger, national “body politic.”
A similar reluctance to adopt the code of competitive sports was displayed by 
the Social-Democratic workers’ sports movement, which was an important part of 
the socialist milieu and hence more interested in cultivating the tightly-knit forms 
of sociability which sustained this milieu. For this reason, working-class sports 
associations tended to “emphasize less competitive physical activities such as 
gymnastics, cycling, hiking and swimming.” Only in the 1920s did working-class 
athletes decide to support team sports and thus also the principles of competition.17 
Even then critics remained. In 1919, Heinrich Ströbel, at this time a member of 
the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD), published a utopian vision of 
“future society.” In this future utopia, he reckoned, hiking would be the most 
popular or perhaps even only sport, replacing the current “passion for one-sided 
stupid muscle sports and the even more stupid rubberneck passion of the masses” 
who attended sports events only as spectators.18 Ströbel apparently not only 
resented the performance criteria of modern sports. He also wanted to revert the 
concomitant drive towards a differentiation between (in the terminology of Talcott 
Parsons) “performance roles” (physicians, journalists, athletes) and “audience 
roles” (patients, newspaper readers, spectators), which is a side-effect of the 
emergence of differentiated sub-systems of society. The emergent differentiation of 
sport as a sub-system was, as these examples indicate, not yet fully completed by 
the end of Imperial Germany.
Football (soccer, for the American reader) can serve as a good example of the 
setbacks and advances that accompanied the emergent differentiation of sports 
based on the principle of competition. Imported in the 1880s from England, 
football became steadily more popular in Germany, especially among students and 
salaried employees. However, popular enthusiasm for the German football league, 
founded in 1903, remained limited until the league embraced a competition in 
which the winner was determined by its standing in the league table. This enabled 
comparisons between the teams and established a clear standard for the evaluation 
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of performance. In a long-term perspective, the establishment of the German 
Football Association (Deutscher Fussball Bund, DFB) in 1900 marked an 
important caesura in the differentiation and concomitant stabilization of the code 
winning/losing. This marked the shift from a ‘sociable game’ that was based on the 
sociability of the middle classes to a ‘game of society’, tending to be more socially 
inclusive because it was oriented solely on the performance of the players. In line 
with this development, the sport developed its own criteria for what constituted a 
fluent, professional style of football, and the competition for victory was 
increasingly cultivated as an end in itself.19 In the perspective of a history of 
society, this emergence of football as a competitive sport was far more important 
than the militarization of the game which can also be observed before 1914.
The emergence of the printed, daily mass media and of competitive sports as 
self-referential sub-systems of society are two important examples of the ways in 
which functional differentiation shaped the trajectory of modernization in 
Imperial Germany. The key point is that the typical form of modernization was 
not the decomposition of poly-functional and hierarchically structured institutions, 
but rather the emergence and stabilization of new, specific forms of addressing the 
social world with codes such as information/non-information or winning/losing. 
It can be added in passing that the emergence of a scientized health system and 
the subsequent medicalization of health problems, which occurred during the 
final decades of the nineteenth century, could also be analysed in such a 
perspective.20 The development of the media society and of the meritocratic, 
achievement- and profit-oriented sports system were part of the political reality of 
Imperial Germany and were in many ways influenced by politics. At the same 
time it becomes apparent that both systems cultivated their own social reality, and 
that in the formation and structure of this social reality, the values and the 
rationality criteria of the monarchical authoritarian state played a subordinate role 
at best. Emergent differentiation shows itself here in the form of a new, self-
referential programming of the system’s perspectives, which had already been 
independent for quite some time in institutional terms, as newspaper companies 
and sports associations.
Seen in this perspective, differentiation also involves a reprogramming of the 
codes of sub-systems which did already exist. An intriguing example of this can 
be seen in the arts, with its heart set on beauty. Of the arts, especially painting is 
relevant here, because the respecification of the ways in which the arts refer to 
“reality” can be shown most vividly in painting. The arts had already broken off 
and defined themselves as a differentiated field of society in the early nineteenth 
century. This field displayed its independence in the institutionalization of 
appropriate social forms for the presentation, assessment, and selling of artworks 
and through the possibility of articulating artistic individuality through changing 
art movements. The development of an audience that discussed and appreciated 
works of art, or of “audience roles,” complemented this process. The further 
advancement of differentiation then showed itself in the specific way in which the 
arts reformulated the functional problem they address, i.e., the transformation of 
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sensual perception into societal communication.21 Towards the end of the century, 
the painters of “Berlin impressionism,” among them Max Liebermann, Lovis 
Corinth, and Max Slevogt, broke away and made themselves independent of the 
reception of French impressionism, which up till then had dominated the 
conventional currents of idealism and realism in painting.
Although one can notice a curious restraint in the range of subjects the Berlin 
Impressionists tended to choose (in which scenes from daily life, like children, 
gardens, and streets took the place of allegorical and mythological subjects), there 
is at the same time an intensification of feeling and a modification of the perception 
of color and form.22 The impressionists of the Berlin secession no longer conceived 
of their paintings as a depiction of the world around them, but concentrated on 
perception itself, on the “process of subjective seeing” that was supposed to be 
expressed through the “intrinsic dynamics” of the colors in the paintings. The next 
important step was taken by the German “artistic revolution” of expressionism. In 
expressionism, the formative elements of paintings—color, the form of shapes—
were seen as an “autonomous structure.” The development of this new, 
autochthonous visual vocabulary was related to the radicalization of the problem 
of depicting reality through images in the age of photography. Expressionism 
responded, therefore, to the recognizable “questionability of the world” through 
the “setting of signs, of meaningful images [Sinn-Bildern] with their own logic.”23 
The goal of this art form was, as the painter Franz Marc formulated it, to “create 
symbols for their time … behind which the technical creator disappears.”24
Expressionism thus distanced itself radically from an artistic strategy that relies 
on a mimesis of the objective “reality.” Its experimental visual vocabulary is only 
one important example, though a very important one in the German context, in 
regard to the groundbreaking transformation of the transcendental categories of 
space and time in the decades before World War I. Some historians might be 
inclined to see the arts as a rather marginal or unimportant sub-system in the 
framework of modern society. But even they cannot fail to acknowledge the 
invalidation of traditional hierarchies, which was triggered by these new artistic 
strategies, as a socio-historical phenomenon sui generis. This development in the 
arts formulated the artistic world view (and through this also the possibility of a 
reference to reality) in a new, radical, subjectivist form.25 It was therefore with 
good reason that Thomas Nipperdey coined the seemingly tautological formulation 
that art in the German Empire was “first and foremost art,” expressing the new 
intensity of emergent differentiation it had arrived at.26 In 1917, the sociologist 
Max Weber highlighted—in a similar fashion and clearly alluding to the artistic 
avant-garde in Imperial Germany—the differentiation of art vis-à-vis the Christian 
religion: “Art now constitutes itself as a cosmos of always consciously apprehended 
autonomous values [Eigenwerte]. Art has taken over the function, regardless of 
how it is interpreted, of inner-worldly redemption.”27
We can see similar developments in other societal fields, for instance in the 
social sciences. One example is the famous value judgment controversy 
(Werturteilsstreit) that from 1905 on took place annually at the convention of the 
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Association for Social Politics (Verein für Socialpolitik). This debate came to a 
climax in a committee meeting of the association in 1913, in which reports on this 
subject matter by all of the well-known opponents were presented.28 Max Weber, 
a key protagonist of this debate, was keen to stress the specific and autonomous 
nature of scientific communication about the “world,” in accordance with his 
approach to define sociology as a Wirklichkeitswissenschaft, a science that should 
focus on the realities of social life. He formulated this approach not in spite of but 
rather because he wanted science to serve as a reflection of “one’s own ultimate 
values.” Weber saw, however, only too clearly that the universal validity of political 
value judgments was illusionary. Here he differed from Gustav Schmoller and his 
students, who tried to base the need to develop the welfare state on their own 
political values. Any such claim to present universal values based on scientific 
investigation was, Weber knew, bound to fail in the modern, pluralized and 
differentiated society of Imperial Germany.29 This controversy again highlights the 
further differentiation of the ways in which communication could refer to social 
reality, in this case through the accentuation of the difference between an academic 
“relation to values” and politically charged “value judgements.”
Max Weber is important for an understanding of the societal history of Imperial 
Germany not only as evidence for the fact that the difference between scientific 
methodology and morality was prominently discussed in the scholarly community. 
His work also lays bare the extent to which analytical observations of the process 
of functional differentiation were part and parcel of a discourse about modernity. 
Emergent functional differentiation was, as mentioned above, not only a structural 
“reality” in turn-of-the-century society. It was also a self-description of society, a 
form in which the structures of society could be described, not least as an 
alternative to other descriptions such as, for instance, “class society.” Apart from 
Weber, a few other prominent examples can be mentioned here briefly. Ernst 
Troeltsch, for example, Weber’s “expert friend” (Fachmenschenfreund) and the most 
prominent Protestant theologian in Germany in the years before World War I, 
developed the program of a “European cultural synthesis” precisely against a 
perceived background of cultural and normative pluralism, a pluralism which had 
developed through the differentiation of social spheres, each with their “own 
rationality.”30 The reformulation of Christian tradition in “Cultural Protestantism,” 
a project initiated and represented by Troeltsch, tried to preserve “religious 
autonomy” at a time when modern science and modern art had made a belief 
obsolete which tried to integrate society on normative religious grounds and thus 
wanted to reverse the advance of functional differentiation.31 Protestantism for 
Troeltsch was supposed to become a religion that proved itself compatible with a 
functionally differentiated modernity—in contrast to the hopes of conservative 
Lutherans who strived for a religiously colored “culture of unity.”32 After assessing 
the state of affairs, it seemed to him that this could only be achieved through more 
individualized forms of piety. Through a more individualized piety, Protestantism 
would manifest itself as a “religiosity that is in its essence related” to modernity 
because it gave room to the trend towards functional differentiation.33
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Individualization is also the header for the theoretical observations developed by 
Georg Simmel in his book “On Social Differentiation,” which was published in 1892 
as a central element of his overall œuvre. Under the heading “intersection between 
social circles,” he discussed what is nowadays analysed by sociologists with the 
concept of the “social role”; the fact that the individual cannot truly fully develop his 
or her personality anywhere in modern society because he or she is forced to switch 
constantly between a multitude of social contexts and act, for instance, both as a 
customer, citizen, father, and religious believer.34 Simmel understood differentiation 
as a variable that develops in correlation with other factors, most crucially a money-
based economy.35 The individual had therefore to “perceive in himself a number of 
demands which cannot be accomplished,” that arose more and more through the 
“growth of the social macrocosm.” Or, in other words: the ongoing differentiation 
made it increasingly difficult to be, at the same time, an informed customer in the 
economy, an active citizen in politics, a caring father and a pious believer. Simmel 
interpreted the increase in the number of “problematic natures in modern times” as 
a consequence of the concomitant fragmentation of individuals.36 It seems difficult 
at times to contextualize Simmel’s sociological theory properly, and his concepts 
often seem to lack historical specificity. There can be no doubt, however, with regard 
to his theories on individualization and differentiation, that Simmel wrote as an 
observer of contemporary German society. This is underscored by Simmel’s specific 
interest in urbanism, if we consider that differentiation processes were especially 
tangible in the rapid urbanization of Wilhelmine Germany.37 The idea of a “labyrinth” 
as the key metaphor for the diversity of social contexts in modern society, a diversity 
which cannot any longer be controlled by any hierarchy or authority, was 
recognizably based on the manifold forms of social life in the big cities.38 In terms 
of an intellectual history of sociological theory, it should also be noted that Simmel 
developed many of his most important ideas on functional differentiation in a 
critical discussion of Wilhelm Dilthey’s ideas, including the very concept of an 
“intersection between social circles.”39 Dilthey can therefore certainly be included 
among the group of reputable and relevant intellectual observers of Imperial 
Germany who described modern society as increasingly shaped by functional 
differentiation.40
At the end of these brief reflections, which conclusions can be drawn about the 
nature of Imperial Germany as a historical epoch when we take processes of 
functional differentiation into account? It should be clear by now that it is 
insufficient to put an authoritarian political system center stage when we write the 
history of Imperial Germany. This argument is, to repeat the point, not meant to 
deny that the political system in Imperial Germany was in fact authoritarian, and 
that fundamental reform blockages could not be lifted until the revolution in 
November 1918 pushed them aside, together with the monarchical system. But 
any historical assessment of Imperial Germany that is primarily focused on the 
lack of reform in the political system just takes a particularly visible part of society 
as a representative for the whole. To take politics as a benchmark for an assessment 
of Imperial Germany more generally does not duly acknowledge the multiplicity 
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of perspectives which are necessary to describe modern society. The same is, by 
the way, true for the attempt to describe Imperial Germany and the whole 
nineteenth century as a “second confessional age.”41 Such an argument is helpful 
if it serves to strengthen our understanding of the importance of religion and of 
confessional opposites for German history after the Kulturkampf. But as a term to 
describe a whole era, “second confessional age” is flawed because no historical 
account can properly describe turn-of-the-century society when it posits that one 
field of society is central or more relevant than others.42
It is impossible, in other words, to write the history of late-nineteenth-century 
Germany in a vanishing point perspective where the lines of all societal fields 
meet. Such a vanishing point is impossible to describe. One might think that such 
an argument could be described as “postmodern.” But that would be wrong. 
Postmodernism as a form of observing modern society is best described by its key 
thesis, the end of metanarratives such as progress, democratization, etc. But if the 
farewell to metanarratives is to be taken seriously, it should include postmodernism 
itself, and then contradicts itself. With good reasons the sociologist Niklas 
Luhmann has thus formulated: “If it is true, it is false.”43 In accordance with 
Luhmann I would insist that the multiplicity of contexts and codes in society is a 
distinctively modern, and not a postmodern phenomenon.
For these reasons I would like to suggest that Imperial Germany is best 
understood as an age of “polycontexturality.” The philosopher Gotthard Günther 
has used this term to describe a situation in which a multitude of observer positions 
exist, various angles of observation which cannot be subsumed under each other 
or be brought into a hierarchical order. In a polycontextural environment, every 
event falls into the reference of different perspectives or contextures.44 According 
to Günther, a contexture is a social domain where a distinction is used and the 
“tertium non datur” applies. Sports, for example, was the domain where winning/
losing was the key distinction, whereas other distinctions did not really matter, so 
“no third position was given.” In the same way, the Wilhelmine daily press 
distinguished between (relevant) information and (obsolete, because already 
reported) non-information. Catholic and Protestants strove to explain plausibly 
and to inculcate the distinction immanent/transcendent, so important for religious 
communication, in a way that was appropriate for contemporary society. But while 
all these sub-systems cultivated their own contextural distinctions, they all could 
also observe events in other sub-systems, and it was not possible to establish any 
superior vantage point for all observations in society.
Imperial Germany can be described as an age of polycontexturality because 
new perspectives on the world of meaningful social communication emerged, 
amongst others, the media, sports, the arts, and the value-free sciences. This 
description of this era also seems appropriate in the context of the sociological 
discourses in Germany at the turn of the century, which attempted with singular 
intensity, in a comparative perspective, to observe and analyze, with seismographic 
accuracy, the polycontextural differentiation of modern society. And any historical 
analysis of a certain period should not only consider social structures, but also the 
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self-descriptions of a society.45 Or, in other words, and formulated in a personalized 
manner: a history of Imperial Germany in which Max Weber figures only as a 
political commentator, but not as an analytical observer of contemporary society, 
is at best a partial history of society.
We must admit, however, that our description of Imperial Germany as an age 
of polycontexturality has to be taken with a pinch of salt. This is due, firstly, to the 
well-established conventions which historians follow when they write general 
histories. In spite of decade-long efforts to underpin historical research with 
theoretical insights from sociology and other disciplines, there are still clear limits 
to the use of more complex concepts in historical narratives. No publisher would 
like to publish a book titled “Imperial Germany as an Age of Polycontexturality,” 
not only because it would not sell, but also because general histories still tend to 
serve a moral purpose and are certainly not the genre where irony and Verfremdung 
(alienation) are used to generate insight.46
Second, open questions remain when we consider the delineation of the period 
between 1871 and 1918. One has to keep in mind that “Imperial Germany” as a 
headline term already privileges the political perspective. In comparison with the 
first half of the nineteenth century, it is justified to emphasize polycontexturality 
as the signature of German history in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, more broadly understood. In the first half of the nineteenth century, 
differentiation took place primarily through decomposition, whereas after 1870 
we can observe ever more emergent processes and a greater dynamic of 
differentiation. This assessment remains true even if we consider the fact that sub-
systems such as law and religion had, of course, already differentiated themselves 
long before the end of the nineteenth century. It should also be repeated that 
Wilhelmine Germany was characterized by intensive theoretical reflections on the 
multitude of observer positions in society, more than any previous period. Our 
description of an “age of polycontexturality” is much more problematic when we 
consider the end of Imperial Germany, as there is a noticeable continuity to the 
Weimar Republic with its unbroken dynamic of differentiation, which also shaped 
the self-descriptions of 1920s German society.47 Thirdly, as a cipher for Imperial 
Germany “polycontexturality” has its limitations, because the very term itself 
denies the idea that historians can find one defining term that encapsulates a 
whole historical era. Unlike what is suggested by the historicist principle of 
individuality, historians cannot describe what an epoch “actually” was. The 
reconstruction of functional differences cannot, in contrast, provide anything 
other than a “different” view on the subject. 
It is important, and so the argument of this essay, that politics is no longer 
privileged as the central analytical perspective for a historiographical assessment 
of Imperial Germany. Instead of privileging one perspective or sub-system of 
society, functional differentiation and the concomitant disruption of 
interdependence between sub-systems have to be considered as signatures of 
modern society. Such an approach then also has to go beyond the distinction of 
politics, economics, and culture, which is widely used in many textbook accounts. 
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Indeed, the dynamic of differentiation in the late nineteenth century can no longer 
be adequately understood with these categories. An interpretation which 
highlights the political costs of authoritarian reform blockades emphatically 
strikes an important point, but fails to account for the society of Wilhelmine 
Germany as a whole, which can only be understood in its differentiation. A history 
of society which describes the modernization around 1900 cannot be written 
without an adequate understanding of the complexities of the processes of 
differentiation.48 It is exactly such an interpretation that is able, in spite of political 
reform blockages, to stress the modernity of German society around the turn of 
the century. Only after these facts have been analyzed that the question of the 
interdependency between the different “powers” (Potenzen) or societal fields in the 
history of Germany 1870–1914 can be considered once again.49 Our focus on the 
modern aspects of functional differentiation, to be sure, is not the same as the 
notion of a pluralized “civil society” based on citizenship and voluntary 
associations.50 While functional sub-systems can be charged politically both in 
liberal and authoritarian terms, the overall result of functional differentiation was 
fragmentation rather than a coherent civil society.
For any historical interpretation of modernization processes it seems advisable 
to dismiss the normative point which posits a general positive interdependency 
between the development of modern industrial capitalism and the implementation 
of a democratic constitutional state. Our emphasis on the polycontexturality of 
Imperial Germany suggests a different reading. It was the clearly pronounced 
dynamics of functional differentiation which created increasing resonance for a 
longing for community in Wilhelmine society. According to this view, only a 
community was able to provide proximity, safety, and unity to the individuals. 
These hopes have to be situated in a functionally differentiated society, where 
individuals are rather “dividuals”—that is, they were included into very different 
functional contexts and were here only addressed with regard to different aspects 
of their person. They were thus not addressed as a whole person, but only as a 
divided person, a “dividual.”51 For these reasons, it is not by chance that the idea 
of a “people’s community” found widespread approval not only in the authoritarian, 
anti-democratic circles of late Imperial Germany. Also Liberals, Social Democrats 
and Catholics, who surely supported a political reform and the introduction of full 
parliamentary government, were fascinated by a concept of community which 
promised to compensate or even eradicate the negative side-effects of functional 
differentiation and thus of a society many Germans after 1900 perceived as 
shattered and fragmented. It is hence not by chance that the very term 
Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community) gained widespread currency during World 
War I, when both the war effort and the fragmentation of a differentiated society 
made the search for more tangible forms of belonging and togetherness 
paramount.52 Also, seen in this perspective, the political history of the cultural 
rejection of modernity since 1890 cannot be appropriately interpreted without 
considering the polycontexturality of society in Imperial Germany.
Translated by Jeffrey Verhey
Societal Differentiation in Imperial Germany 49
notes
 1. H.-U. Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol. 3: 1848/49–1914 (Munich, 1995), 1288, 1291. 
I would like to thank Helmut W. Smith and the editors of this volume for their critical feedback 
on a first draft of this article. The Department of History at the University of Sheffield contributed 
towards the translation of this piece, a support that is gratefully acknowledged.
 2. R.O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (London, 2005).
 3. On historiography see T. Kühne, 1998. ‘Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–1918 und seine 
politische Kultur: Demokratisierung, Segmentierung, Militarisierung’, Neue Politische Literatur 
(NPL) 43, 206–63; M. Jefferies, Contesting the German Empire, 1871–1918, (Oxford, 2008). On 
the European context see B. Ziemann and T. Mergel,‘Introduction’, in idem (eds.), European 
Political History 1870–1913 (Aldershot, 2007) XI–XXVI.
 4. Wehler, Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 1294f.
 5. See N. Luhmann, Observations on Modernity (Stanford, 1998).
 6 J. Breuilly, ‘Modernisation as Social Evolution: The German Case, c.1800–1880’, Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society 15 (2005), 121.
 7. H. Tyrell, ‘Zur Diversität der Differenzierungstheorie. Soziologiehistorische Anmerkungen’, 
Soziale Systeme 4 (1998), 125–27; U. Schimank/U. Volkmann, 1999. Gesellschaftliche 
Differenzierung, Bielefeld: Transkript; A. Nassehi, ‘Die Theorie funktionaler Differenzierung im 
Horizont ihrer Kritik’, Zeitschrift für Soziologie 33 (2004), 98–118. The key text for the theory 
of functional differentiation is N. Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt, 1997), 
595–865. See idem,The Differentiation of Society (New York, 1982).
 8. Schimank/Volkmann, Differenzierung, 9.
 9. Tyrell, ‘Diversität’, 127.
10. Wehler, Gesellschaftsgeschichte, 1283, 1249. 
11. N. Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media (Cambridge, 2007).
12. P. Fritzsche, Reading Berlin 1900 (Cambridge, MA, 1996), 10, 16f., 48f., 75f., 236ff.
13. R. Stichweh, Inklusion und Exklusion. Studien zur Gesellschaftstheorie (Bielefeld, 2005), 165.
14. See T. Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918, vol. 1: Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist (Munich, 
1990), 803f.
15. Fritzsche, Reading, 160f.; see B. Ziemann, ‘Der “Hauptmann von Köpenick” – Symbol für den 
Sozialmilitarismus im wilhelminischen Deutschland?’, in V. Precan et al. (eds.), Grenzüberschreitungen 
oder der Vermittler Bedrich Loewenstein (Prague 1999), 252–64.
16. Nipperdey, Arbeitswelt, 174.
17. R.F. Wheeler, ‘Organized Sport and Organized Labour: The Workers’ Sports Movement’, Journal 
of Contemporary History 13 (1978), 196f.
18. Cited in R. Graf, ‘Die Politik der reinen Vernunft. Das Scheitern des linken Sozialdemokraten 
Heinrich Ströbel zwischen Utopie und Realpolitik,’ in A. Wirsching and J. Eder (eds.), 
Vernunftrepublikanismus in der Weimarer Republik (Stuttgart, 2008), 138.
19. C. Eisenberg, ‘Fußball in Deutschland 1890–1914. Ein Gesellschaftsspiel für bürgerliche 
Mittelschichten’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft (GG) 20 (1994), 203. For the semantic shift in 
the meaning of Gesellschaft from ‘sociability’ to ‘society’ see A. Kieserling, ‘Das Ende der guten 
Gesellschaft’, Soziale Systeme 7 (2001), 177–91.
20. Nipperdey, Arbeitswelt, 150–66.
21. D. Schwanitz, ‘Systems Theory and the Difference between Communication and Consciousness: 
An Introduction to a Problem and Its Context’, Modern Language Notes 111 (1996), 488–505.
22. A. Wesenberg (ed.), Berliner Impressionismus. Werke der Berliner Secession aus der Nationalgalerie 
(Berlin, 2006).
23. Nipperdey, Arbeitswelt, 705f., 711, 714; G. Simmel, ‘Tendencies in German Life and Thought 
since 1870’, International Monthly 5 (1902), 96.
24. Cited in W.J. Mommsen, ‘Die Herausforderung der bürgerlichen Kultur durch die Avantgarde. 
Zum Verhältnis von Kultur und Politik im Wilhelminischen Deutschland’, GG 20 (1994), 439.
50 Benjamin Ziemann
25. For a broader perspective, see S. Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880–1918 (Cambridge, 
MA, 2003), 180–210.
26. T. Nipperdey, Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918, vol. 2: Machtstaat vor der Demokratie (Munich, 
1992), 894.
27. M. Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, vol. 1 (Tübingen, 1988), 555.
28. Cf. H. Nau (ed.), Die Äußerungen zur Werturteilsdiskussion im Ausschuß des Vereins für Sozialpolitik 
(1913) (Marburg, 1996).
29. F. Tenbruck, Das Werk Max Webers. Gesammelte Aufsätze zu Max Weber (Tübingen, 1999), 257.
30. F.-W. Graf/H. Ruddies, ‘Religiöser Historismus: Ernst Troeltsch 1865–1923’, in F.-W. Graf (ed.), 
Profile des neuzeitlichen Protestantismus, vol. 2/2 (Gütersloh, 1993), 315–17.
31. E. Troeltsch, ‘Die Selbständigkeit der Religion’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 5 (1896), 361–
436; 6 (1896), 71–110, 167–218; see F.-W. Graf, ‘Protestantische Theologie in der Gesellschaft 
des Kaiserreichs’, in: idem (ed.), Profile des neuzeitlichen Protestantismus, vol. 2/1 (Gütersloh, 
1992), 16–22.
32. Graf, Theologie, 17.
33. V. Drehsen, ‘Die “Normativität” neuzeitlicher Frömmigkeitsgeschichte. Zur aktuellen Bedeutung 
der klassischen Religionssoziologie Ernst Troeltschs’, in H. Renz and F.-W. Graf (eds.), 
Protestantismus und Neuzeit (Gütersloh, 1984), 276.
34. G. Simmel, ‘Über sociale Differenzierung’ (1892), in: idem, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 2 (Frankfurt, 
1989), 109–295.
35. Tyrell, ‘Diversität’, 134f. From the rich literature on Simmel, compare only D. Frisby, Fragments 
of Modernity. Theories of Modernity in the Work of Simmel, Kracauer and Benjamin (Cambridge, MA, 
1986), 81ff.
36. Simmel, ‘Differenzierung’, 286.
37. G. Simmel, ‘Die Grossstädte und das Geistesleben’, Jahrbuch der Gehe-Stiftung zu Dresden 9 
(1903), 185–206; idem, ‘Tendencies’.
38. Frisby, Fragments, 85f.
39. K.C. Köhnke, Der junge Simmel in Theoriebeziehungen und sozialen Bewegungen, (Frankfurt, 1996), 
321–34, 380–97.
40. A. Hahn, ‘Die Systemtheorie Wilhelm Diltheys’, Berliner Journal für Soziologie 9 (1999), 5–24.
41. O. Blaschke, ‘Das 19. Jahrhundert: Ein Zweites Konfessionelles Zeitalter?’, GG 26 (2000), 38–75.
42. As a critique, see B. Ziemann, ‘Säkularisierung, Konfessionalisierung, Organisationsbildung. 
Aspekte der Sozialgeschichte der Religion im langen 19. Jahrhundert’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 
47 (2007), 497–501.
43. Luhmann, Gesellschaft, 1144.
44. G. Günther, ‘Life as Poly-Contexturality’, in idem, Beiträge zur Grundlegung einer operationsfähigen 
Dialektik, vol. 2 (Hamburg, 1979), 283–306; U. Schimank, Theorien gesellschaftlicher 
Differenzierung (Opladen, 1996), 185ff.
45. See P. Nolte, Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft. Selbstentwurf und Selbstbeschreibung im 20. 
Jahrhundert (Munich, 2000). For a critique, see B. Ziemann, ‘Die Soziologie der Gesellschaft. 
Selbstverständnis, Traditionen und Wirkungen einer Disziplin’, NPL 50 (2005), 56–61.
46. H.U. Gumbrecht, In 1926: Living on the Edge of Time (Cambridge, MA, 1998), 411–36.
47. Gumbrecht, In 1926, 253ff.
48. J. Osterhammel, ‘Gesellschaftsgeschichte und Historische Soziologie’, in idem, D. Langewiesche 
and P. Nolte (eds.), Wege der Gesellschaftsgeschichte (Göttingen, 2006), 100.
49. See the reflections in Nipperdey, Machtstaat, 894–903.
50. As a good overview on historiographical debates, see S.-L. Hoffmann, Civil Society (Houndmills, 
2006).
51. A. Nassehi, Differenzierungsfolgen. Beiträge zur Soziologie der Moderne (Opladen, 1999), 117.
52. G. Mai, ‘“Verteidigungskrieg” und “Volksgemeinschaft”. Staatliche Selbstbehauptung, nationale 
Solidarität und soziale Befreiung in Deutschland in der Zeit des Ersten Weltkrieges’, in W. 
Michalka (ed.), Der Erste Weltkrieg. Wirkung – Wahrnehmung – Analyse (Munich, 1994), 583–
602. See also M. Föllmer, ‘The Problem of National Solidarity in Interwar Germany’, German 
History 23 (2005), 202–31.
